Motion For Mistrial Filed : Will Court Be Man Enough to Admit to Its Errors?
Laura Judith Lynn
2946 Garnet Avenue
San Diego, CA 92109
LAURA LYNN, IN PRO PER
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
LAURA JUDITH LYNN,
TIMOTHY MATHEW PETER LYNN,
Case No.: PD 016769
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL, VACATE ALL ORDERS DATED SEPTEMBER 2, 1997 OR SUBSEQUENT AND TO ENTER NEW ORDERS THAT REFLECT AN EQUITIBLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY; DECLARATION OF PLAINTIFF IN SUPPORT THEREOF; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
Judge: Thomas Trent Lewis
Hearing Date: May 7, 2014 at 8:30 a.m.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on , at o’clock or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, in Department 79 of the above entitled court located at 111 N Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA, Laura Judith Lynn, Plaintiff will move pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §473, the equitable powers of the court and the due process clause of the California and United States Constitution, for an order to:
1. Declare a mistrial.
2. Vacate any and all orders in PD016769 dated September 2, 1997 or subsequently.
3. To enter new orders granting what was community property, especially the property known as 28735 and 29737 Meadow Grass Drive, Castaic, CA, and any property obtained using the aforementioned property as collateral, proof of ability to qualify for a loan or capital to pay for the property to the adult children Sean Patrick Lynn and Branden Joseph Lynn (aka “Buddy”) in constructive trust with Laura Judith Lynn as trustee.
4. To enter new child support orders granting no support to either party, but any and all retirement benefits from The County of Los Angeles or The City of Los Angeles due to either party to be paid directly, in equal portion to each of the two adult children.
NOW COMES the Plaintiff, Laura Judith Lynn (“Laura”), and moves this Court declare a mistrial, to vacate all orders filed in case PD 016769 on September 2, 1997 and subsequent, and upon declaration and testimony offered in hearing to enter new orders granting what was community property, especially the property known as 28735 Meadow Grass Drive, Castaic, CA, and any property obtained using the aforementioned property as collateral, proof of ability to qualify for a loan or capital to pay for the property to the adult children Sean Patrick Lynn and Branden Joseph Lynn (aka “Buddy”) in constructive trust with Laura Judith Lynn as trustee. This motion is made pursuant to CCP 473(d), the Due Process clause of the California and United States Constitution and the inherent equitable powers of the court.
This motion is based on the declaration filed herein, points and authorities, testimony to be presented at hearing, and the record, as such exists, including all clerk’s transcripts from appellate case numbers B208080, B218440, B221555, B225946, B228694, B230298.
Signed March 30, 2014 Laura Judith Lynn
I swear under penalty of perjury according to the laws of the State of California that everything said in these pleadings for motion to declare a mistrial, to vacate all orders of September 2, 1997 and subsequent and to enter new orders and judgments is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
March 30, 2014 Laura Judith Lynn
DECLARATION OF LAURA JUDITH LYNN
I, Laura Judith Lynn, declare as follows:
I am the petitioner in these proceedings. If called upon as a witness, I could and would testify competently to the following facts, all which are within my own personal knowledge.
This case is a petition for dissolution of marriage and custody filed by the Petitioner, Laura Lynn, sometimes called Laura, against the Respondent, Timothy Lynn, sometimes called Tim, in July 1996. Laura was granted primary physical custody in March 1997 after an evaluation was performed by JoAnne Feigin, LCSW. On September 2, 1997 Tim went into court ex parte without serving Laura and was granted a change of custody. Tim did file a proof of service that said he caused a woman named Barbara St. Ours to be served as Laura’s attorney of record. Three other declarations were filed that explained that insufficient notice attempts were made by the respondent on Barbara St. Ours: Barbara L. Roberts, Attorney Trudy J. Robinson and Barbara St. Ours herself. Each declaration was signed and filed on September 17, 1997. California Family Code §215 is clear that service upon the attorney of record is not sufficient. Compounding the insufficiency, Barbara St. Ours was suspended from the practice of law at the time of service. That the judge overlooked the improper service may cause a reasonable person to believe he was biased. The Court did not have personal jurisdiction and continued to rely on the hearing and orders of September 2, 1997 in the genesis of orders written throughout the entire proceedings.
Commissioner Robert Zakon even said he remembered the case and the findings, but misstated several facts during the hearing of June 20, 2001, before granting sole legal custody to respondent.
Custody was never returned to Laura and the Court never acknowledged the invalidity of the orders of September 2, 1997 and subsequently. The documents which showed inadequacy of service were removed from the Court’s file. No documents and actions dated between July 9, 1996 and August 15, 1998 appear in the electronic case summary. (CT 000001-000021, B230298 (all references will be to this transcript, unless specified))
Laura replaced legal counsel with Gary Weyman. Mr. Weyman was incompetent counsel, as exhibited by his lack of invoking Family Code 215, and his refusal, in writing, to file a CCP 170.1 motion for disqualification against a judicial officer who was later determined by the California Supreme Court to be biased against Laura. Mr. Weyman did not transmit the proof of service of September 2, 1997s hearing to new counsel when Laura replaced Weyman.
Mr. Weyman was recommended by Laura’s sister, Mary Sherman and her husband Jeff Sherman. It was not until 2012 that Laura discovered a friendship since childhood existed between Jeff Sherman’s brother David Sherman and Commissioner Alan Friedenthal. It is interesting to note that Jeff and Mary Sherman and their daughters will receive millions of dollars more in inheritance, since Sean and Branden were effectively cut from their maternal grandparents trust under the reasoning that the maternal grandparents did not want Tim to control the money that would have gone to Sean and Branden. There are better ways to effectuate keeping the inheritance out of Tim’s reach, but it appears Mary and Jeff have undue influence over the maternal grandparents and may have orchestrated the ridiculous decisions made by Commissioner Friedenthal, to help lobby for a bigger share of the substantial pie.
JoAnne Feigin produced a second evaluation in 1997. Although she did recommend switching custody time share, she did state that custody should be joint. After a deposition and testimony from Ms. Feigin, the court ordered a timeshare of about 51/49. If Tim complied with that order, which gave the other parent first right of refusal for any time a parent could not exercise their control of the children, Laura would have significantly more time with the children. Instead, Tim let his parents Jim and Helen raise the children for a significant part of his time share.
Then, in 2007, the older child attempted suicide at Tim’s home, ran away to the Laura’s home in San Diego, was abusing drugs and alcohol and said Tim was physically abusing him for his entire life. Tim refused to sign permission for counseling for the child. The commissioner who wrote the original orders, Robert Zakon, had retired. Laura felt hopeful going for a change in custody.
The new commissioner, Alan H. Friedenthal made orders that were even more incredulous. He gave sole legal and physical custody of both children to Tim, with no psychiatric evaluation, just on the word of the appointed minor’s counsel Kenneth P. Sherman. On July 16, 2008, a full year after appointed to represent the children, Mr. Sherman filed an ex parte motion to be relieved as counsel due to a “conflict of interest”, but was not ordered to share what the conflict was or when it came up.
The older son fell under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in San Diego. They did a full evaluation and ordered that son be placed with Laura 100% of the time. Still, the orders of the family court in Los Angeles kept the younger son with Tim or his family.
When Tim’s sister abducted her own two children, Laura posted missing children posters created by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. Immediately, appointed minor’s counsel Kenneth P. Sherman requested and the Court granted monitored visitation for Laura. (CT 000113 starting at line 14) When even the limited monitored visits were denied by Tim and his family, Laura begged the court to intervene, with no success.
Laura discovered that the original judge was a co-defendant in a lawsuit with the new commissioner’s wife, also a commissioner. These types of facts caused Laura to have a reasonable belief that the new judge was biased, also.
Laura filed a California Civil Code of Procedure §170.1 Motion for Disqualification of Commissioner Alan H. Friedenthal from the case on May 6, 2008. The motion was denied verbally, but not mentioned in the Order After Hearing. Laura filed a second CCP 170.1 Motion on May 16, 2008, asking for a written response. The motion was denied. Laura filed a Petition for Writ of Mandate to Disqualify Comm. Alan H. Friedenthal, B208080 on May 27, 2008 in the 2nd District Court of Appeals. The Petition was denied summarily on May 29, 2008. No reason was given for the denial.
On June 9, 2008, with no motion filed and no order made, the record of appeal B208080 was marked “Confidential” and the online docket was altered to say “case not found” if the case name or number was queried. This was an alleged violation of Government Code 6200, which clearly states that it is a crime to hide a court file.
A year later, on June 25, 2009, Court Counsel Brett Bianco sent an email to Commissioner Friedenthal. It was left loose in the file for some unknown reason and became a part of the record. The email said:
“I suggest the following minute order: ‘The court believes that the interests of justice require that it not participate further in this proceeding. Accordingly, the court voluntarily recuses itself pursuant to Section 170.1(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The matter is returned to Department 87 for further proceedings.’
“Judge Feffer is aware and understands that the matter will be returned to her.
“D. Brett Bianco, Court Counsel
Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles
The words “suggest the following minute order” and “Judge Feffer is aware and understands that the matter will be returned to her” are scratched out. Mr. Bianco then sat in on the first hearing in front of Judge Feffer. This gave the appearance that the fresh judge was not actually fresh, but was coached to rule against Laura.
As a further example of the conniving and mean spiritedness with which the court treated Laura, the minute order recusal was not mailed to Laura. Instead, she was told by telephone to come for a hearing to court in North Los Angeles County from her home in San Diego, first thing the next morning. At court, the clerk met Laura in the hallway and handed her a copy of the recusal. She was not offered any opportunity to speak and did not see the judge. She had no other reason to be in court, and so turned around and drove the 120 miles home.
There is no entry on the online docket to reflect the recusal of Commissioner Friedenthal. There is no entry on the online docket to reflect the motions for disqualification of May 6, nor May 16, 2008. ( CT 001-022.) The file was customarily missing (CT 000061,000062) and so there was no record of the motions for disqualification when the fresh judge took over. She had only what Brett Bianco and Comm. Friedenthal told her in back rooms to base her opinion of the history of the case.
On April 7, 2009 an order after hearing was filed. (CT000091-93)There are several handwritten notes and cross-outs on the order. The date was typed as March 10, 2009, then crossed out and handwritten as January 21. There are two handwritten notes initialed by the judge that specify that the child cannot live in Tim’s parent’s house. Though Laura would not want the child to live in that house, this clause was added long after the hearing of January 21 in response to ex parte meetings between the judge, Tim and unknown parties in which Laura was not notified of a hearing and no transcript was made. It is reasonable to believe the judge was deflecting any accusation that he was privy to an alleged conspiracy to transfer custody back to Tim on paper only for the purpose of defrauding Laura of the child support ordered.
Tim filed an Order to Show Cause and Supporting Declaration on May 4, 2009. (CT 000095) In it he wrote “I am requesting item 5 and 6 be removed from the court order dated April 7, 2009…these orders are not in front of this judge and it’s not proper for this judge to make orders on a case he is not presiding over. Further the issue was not before the court and I had no chance to be heard on these issues.” This is one of the few agreements Tim and Laura have in regards to this case. Both said the custody order of January 21, 2009 was improper. It is an abuse of discretion that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals wrote and upheld the child support order using a custody order written improperly as its basis.
Laura filed a motion and then a Petition for Supersedes to vacate the orders of Commissioner Friedenthal and move the case to San Diego in August 2009. The basis was the recusal of Commissioner Friedenthal; Inappropriate Facebook postings about litigants by Comm. Friedenthal’s wife, Comm. Steff Padilla; and the younger son’s poor academic performance, a 0.4 GPA, amongst other things. These petitions were denied by the Court of Appeals and the California Supreme Court, again without reason.
Laura sent several letters of complaint to the California Commission on Judicial Performance in regards to the bias of Commissioner Friedenthal , Judge Feffer and some presiding judges between May 2008 and December 2012.
On April 3, 2012, after the briefing of her appeal was complete, the California Commission on Judicial Performance issued its first public admonishment against a judicial officer who presided over this case, Commissioner Friedenthal. The judge was found to have discouraged this Petitioner and other litigants from filing grievances, writing otherwise protected speech and assembling peaceably.
It is standard practice for the CJP to send a form letter to complainants whose complaints will not be investigated past the initial stage. Over 99% of the complainants receive these letters. Laura received several of these form letters in regards to some of her complaints, but some complaints did not meet with this kind of denial letter. Unfortunately, if a complaint results in a private disciplinary action, the complainant has no way of knowing the outcome. Laura can reasonably believe that there were at least three other judicial officers, including presiding judges, who received private discipline as a result of her complaints.
Still, all six of Laura’s pleas to the appellate court were denied.
The public admonishment of Commissioner Friedenthal was released three years after the last act addressed in the admonishment was committed. (Laura filed more complaints against Commissioner Friedenthal and Judge feffer since then that are not resolved.) Laura brought the admonishment to the attention of the appellate court at the earliest opportunity, at oral arguments, but apparently, while the rules of procedure don’t apply to Tim, they do apply to Laura and the admonishment, not being brought up at the trial court (because it was not released yet), could not be brought up at the appeal.
The Justices did not even mention the admonishment in their lengthy opinion.
Tim did not file a responsive brief and made no oral argument in any of the appeals. The appellate justices asked no questions of Laura at any of her oral arguments. Several of the arguments used to justify the Court’s Opinion were offered sua sponte by the Court. Even though Laura requested an opportunity to address the sua sponte arguments in her Petition for Rehearing, this basic element of due process was denied in violation of California Government Code § 68081.
Laura complained of file tampering both administratively and at trial. (CT 000059-65) Though the Judicial Council attorney acknowledged in an internal email that there may be a problem with back dating, et al, no correction was ever made with a proper record.
In 2011 the paper file in the court was altered again to include the September 2, 1997 documentation, et al. Though the presiding family law judge, The Honorable Marjorie Steinberg wrote an order that said “loose papers” were added to the file, she did not specify what the loose papers were.
Laura tried to file a simple change of address on July 15, 2011 at the trial court level, but it was returned by the clerk with a cryptic note that the file was not at that courthouse, Van Nuys. A volley of letters between Laura and Judge Steinberg ensued, with both sending copies to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Judge Steinberg claimed that after some searching she found the file was in San Fernando and never was sent to Van Nuys. That was not true. Laura had seen the file in Van Nuys in May 2010. About one week after Laura wrote to the FBI with facts that are evidence that judge Steinberg’s lie was an obstruction of justice, Judge Steinberg announced her plans for a somewhat early retirement from the bench. This simple denial of due process, the lack of a proper record and the denial of the opportunity to file even the most basic notices at the trial court level should compel the court to render this a mistrial.
From November 30, 2012 to December 4, 2012 Laura attempted, once again, to access her file. She was considering her options, as to whether to file a petition for writ of cert to the United States Supreme Court or to start again at the trial court level to move for a mistrial. The clerk said that the file was missing. As of January 9, 2013, the file was not available.
Judge Thomas Trent Lewis made an effort to have the clerk find the file, but as of January 23, 2014, it was missing. Judge Lewis invited the litigants to reproduce the sections of the file they deemed important. For lack of unlimited funds, Laura kept her contribution to about 2000 pages.
Hopefully, this snippet of the proceedings over 17 years will convince the court that the proceedings were a travesty of justice and that, in the best interests of the children, remedial orders will be made.
Both children aged out. Both children are dependent on cannabis. Neither is even close to his potential for academic achievement. Both have impaired ability to work for eight hours per day. The older child has an adult felony offense for growing and or distribution of cannabis on his record. This restricts him from working as a licensed real estate agent, which he studied for and passed the exam for. He has two children who he cannot afford to support and who are living, he says, in Orange County with Tim and one of Tim’s girlfriends, Meredith Zamboni.
Both Sean and Buddy tell me they get no financial support from Tim. I give them each one quarter of any money I receive from investments given to me by my family. I also offer to employ them for as many hours as they want to work for $10 per hour or as partners selling things on ebay and Amazon.
Branden “Buddy” came to live with me three days before his 18th birthday. He had been living with Helen Lynn, Tim’s mom four days a week and his girlfriend’s family three days a week when he was 17. Now he has a room in a house about a mile from me.
The father seemingly separated the children from their mother in an attempt to obtain “child support” and told the mother, in front of minor’s counsel Kenneth P.Sherman that the mother’s inheritance would all go to him (Tim). Equity demands that the father be divested of money and property that should have supported the children. The respondent was not using the community property retained by him to pay for tutors, art lessons, music lessons, or trips for the children. He was using it to support several girlfriends at once, gambling trips to Vegas and supporting his convicted child abductor sister and her children.
The equitable thing would be to give the adult children the Castaic property, which has two houses that are rented out. They could either move in there, or use the rental income to pay for housing.
Because of the restraining order against me, I cannot fully investigate Tim’s finances. From what the children told me, he bought several properties and may have inherited properties from two grandmothers who passed away. The Castaic house should be paid for, unless it was encumbered to purchase other properties. Tim should be ordered to disclose his assets and arrange to put the property known as 28735 and 28737 Meadow Grass Drive, and any fruit of his ill-gotten gains in constructive trust, with each child an equal beneficiary and Laura the trustee.
Signed under penalty of perjury according to the laws of the State of California,
March 30, 2014 Laura Judith Lynn
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
Because of the length of the case, and that some orders may be circulating that were falsified or not entered in the file, plaintiff is asking for the blanket ruling that all orders of September 2, 1997 and subsequent be vacated, without presenting copies of the actual orders to this pleading.
There are three very strong reasons to declare a mistrial and vacate orders in this case.
1. There is no accurate record of the proceedings. The record was missing several times and for extended periods, often when there was a hearing, altered, and is missing again.
2. The court did not have personal jurisdiction at the September 2, 1997 hearing, due to lack of service and never returned to the previous orders. Lack of service invalidated all orders subsequent pursuant to Family Code 215 and due process.
3. The plaintiff asked for a disqualification of the presiding judicial officer, was denied, and years later the California Supreme Court determined the judicial officer was indeed biased.
4. Each of the above reasons renders the orders void. A void order is a nullity. It can be vacated at any time pursuant to the inherent equitable powers of the court and CCP 473(d).
The rule is a judgment may be attacked in four ways, by motion for a new trial, by appeal, by motion for relief, or by independent suit in equity, though court, additionally has inherent power to protect sanctity of its judgments against extrinsic fraud or to set aside judgments void upon their face, applies to interlocutory and final judgments of divorce. Heathman v. Vant (1959) 343 P.2d 104, 172 C.A.2d 639. West’s Ann. CCP 473
One of the earliest articulations of the standard of when a mistrial should be granted comes from an opinion written by the 19th-century Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, who wrote that judges should declare a mistrial whenever “there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.”
Judgment or order may be set aside on ground of fraud, mistake or lack of jurisdiction, independent of remedy found in this section. In re Sankey’s Estate (1926) 249 P. 517, 199 C. 391. West’s Ann. CCP 473
Trial court may not vacate its judgment except on motion for new trial, on motion where conclusions of law are inconsistent with findings or judgment is inconsistent with special verdict, on motion to vacate judgment at any time where judgment is void on its face, by an independent suit in equity, whether judgment is regular on its face but extrinsically void for want of jurisdiction or by reason of fraud or mistake, or on motion under this section. Ransom v. Los Angeles City High School Dist. Of Los Angeles Couty (1955) 277 P.2d 455, 129 C.A.2d500. West’s Ann. CCP 473
Court’s authority to vacate judgment not void on face of judgment roll, but void in fact for want of jurisdiction of person of defendant, exists independent of statute. Richert v. Benson Lumber Co. (1934) 34 P.2d 840, 139 C.A. 671. West’s Ann. CCP 473
A void order can be set aside whenever it comes before a court. Dolan v. Superior Court of California in and for City and County of San Francisco (1920) 190 P. 469, 47 C.A. 235. West’s Ann. CCP 473
A void judgment may be vacated upon motion of aggrieved party. Mechanics Bank of Richmond v. Thole (1971) 98 Cal. Rptr. 82, 20 C.A.3d 884; Ross v. Murphy (1952) 248 P.2d 122, 133 C.A.2d 453. West’s Ann. CCP 473
A court has a right to set aside its order or judgment when it is void and a mere nullity. Casner v. San Diego Trust & Savings Bank (1939) 94 P.2d 65, 34 C.A.2d 524. West’s Ann. CCP 473
Record showing that fee owner was not served in mortgage foreclosure action, foreclosure decree was void and properly vacated, though application for vacation was made over year after judgment, and judgment had been satisfied of record. Hurt v. Pico Inv. Co. (1932) 15 P.2d 203, 127 C.A. 106. West’s Ann. CCP 473
Neither the failure on the part of a party to appeal from an order void on its face, nor lapse of time, can make such order valid, or impair the power of the court to formally vacate it on its own motion and without notice. People v. Davis (Sup 1904) 77 P. 1132. West’s Ann. CCP 473 Commissioner Robert Zakon, Commissioner and Judge Elizabeth Feffer should each have vacated the orders of September 2, 1997 and subsequent due to improper service.
The Legislature of the State of California recognizes all litigants’ right to an accurate record of proceedings in both Government Code 6200 and 69846. G.C. 69846 says “The clerk of the superior court shall safely keep or dispose of according to law all papers and records filed or deposited in any action or proceeding before the court.”
Thus, as to papers or records filed or deposited in any action, the superior court may either “safely keep” them or “dispose of [them] according to law.” (Gov. Code, § 69846.) People v. Galland, 45 Cal. 4th 354, 197 P.3d 736, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 841.
At the time of preparing the record on appeal for B230298, the case file was “missing” from the courthouse. The clerks transcript reflects missing documents, from the list of documents requested. The online record was faulty. The case file was customarily missing, as it was on May 6, 2008.On May 27, 2008, Court services supervisor Karen Brown wrote a letter that reflects that the file was missing.
The plaintiff made a diligent effort to find the file on several occasions and with no success.
Government Code 68152 provides for the retention of all papers filed in a family law case for 30 years. Clearly, the petitioner was denied her right to equal protection under the law when denied access to her record, even for the purpose of producing a record on appeal.
CCP 473(d) says, inter alia, “the court may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.”
This section is remedial and is to be liberally construed so as to dispose of cases upon their substantial merits. Taliaferro v Talliaferro (1963) 31 Cal.Rptr. 774, 217 C.A.2d 216; De Mello v. De Mello (1954) 268 P. 2d 26, 124 C.A.2d 135. West’s Ann. CCP 473
This section should be liberally construed. Thomasian v. Superior Court in and for City and County of San Francisco (1954) 265 P.2d 165, 122 C.A.2d 322. West’s Ann. CCP 473
Motion made more than one year after entry of interlocutory divorce judgment reciting wife’s default was not too late, and Superior court had jurisdiction to grant the motion, which was addressed to inherent power of the court to set aside void judgments and was based on theory that husband had actually served the summons and complaint rather than that daughter of the parties had done so as stated in her affidavit. Sullivan v. Sullivan (1967) 64 Cal. Rptr. 82, 256 C.A.2d 301. West’s Ann. CCP 473
A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded a valid adjudication, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair, or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce it. It may be attacked by a person adversely affected by it, in any proceeding, direct or collateral, and at any time. All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. In other words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there were no judgment. It accordingly leaves the parties litigant in the same position they were in before the trial. 30A Am Jur Judgments ” 44, 45
The general rule is that a judgment which is void cannot be cured by subsequent proceedings. Such a judgment cannot be validated by citing the parties against whom it was rendered, to show cause why it should not be declared valid, or by an affirmance by an appellate court, especially if such affirmance is put upon grounds not touching the validity of the judgment. 30A Am Jur section 45, 46.
In the hundreds of cases that come up in a LEXIS search using the keywords “Mistrial” and “Judicial Misconduct”, the vast majority are cases where the appellant asked for a mistrial due to bias and was denied based upon a lack of showing of bias. In the case at bar, the appellant overcame almost insurmountable odds to convince the CJP to declare a judicial officer was biased. Equity demands that the orders of that judicial officer and all orders based on it are vacated.
While there is a temptation to enumerate the dozens of examples that show bias by the Court, it is only necessary to say Laura petitioned the Court to disqualify the judicial officer presiding due to bias, the Court refused, and years later, the judicial officer was found to have been biased. All proceedings subsequent were contaminated.
It was the bias of the Court against Laura that caused the compounded violation of due process. There is no way the appellate justices could read decisions by a person, Comm. Friedenthal, who, off the record called Laura “one of the sickest, pathetic things on the face of the planet” even though he never saw a psychiatric evaluation of Laura and not be swayed against Laura. But a review of the two custody evaluations made by JoAnne Feigin, LCSW, including an MMPI, find Laura to be well within normal, with no history of drug abuse or alcohol use, and to be an interesting and stimulating parent who was so involved in her children’s education as to home school them until the court ordered differently.
The petitioner was not disappointed by an adverse ruling that didn’t give her the timeshare hoped for. The petitioner fought against draconian orders that took a loving mother away from her children and then, instead of as in the child whose mother passes away, and the child is told warm and appreciative stories of the mother, the court allowed the respondent to tell his children their mother was a slut who didn’t love them, who abandoned them, who was so violent, even the monitor was fearful of her.
The children were removed from school by the respondent after the tenth grade, even though one child was failing most classes. The children, with a brilliant mother and a grandfather who worked his way from living in Boyle Heights to being a millionaire surgeon, are left with a dismal economic future and deep psychological disturbance.
The void custody orders were not in the best interest of the children as per Family Code §3011. They did not promote frequent and continuing contact with both parents as per F.C. §3020. Minor’s counsel did not discharge his duties as per §3151.
While child custody is a moot issue, in that both children aged out, it is important for their emotional well-being that the court correct its orders in writing. The children live with the cognitive dissonance of knowing their mother loves them and is a “good” person, but the authority of the court telling them otherwise. Vacating the errant child custody orders, on the record, is an important step in the healing process for the children. Plaintiff is not presenting any expert testimony to substantiate this claim, for lack of financial resources. But it should be common sense.
Family Code 3910 allows for the court to order child support for children who will otherwise become dependent on the state.
Equity demands the respondent turn over the community property and all his unjust enrichment to the children. Plaintiff’s prayer is that The Court will exercise its power to correct these tragic circumstances as best as it can.
Laura Judith Lynn
Sworn & subscribed
this 30th day of March, 2014.